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Equal Protection, Rational
Basis Review, and the Impact of
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
BY RICHARD B. SAPHIRB*
I. INTRODUCTION
mong the most interesting and vigorously debated questions inAcontemporary constitutional law is whether judicial review
should proceed in a "rule-like" or "standard-like" fashion. As
Professor Kathleen Sullivan has recently noted, disagreements within the
Supreme Court are frequently about much more than the content of
particular constitutional doctrines. The Justices, Sullivan notes, "split not
only on results but on methods--on the forms that the vast grid of
doctrines, tests, and formulas comprising constitutional law should take."'
According to some accounts, these methodological disputes2 can be
quite consequential.3 On a practical level, the judge's methodological
"Professor of Law, University of Dayton. Work on this Article was supported
by a University of Dayton School of Law summer research grant. Thanks go to Jan
Konya and Dan Martin for research assistance, and to Jan Konya, Ann Bartow,
Michael Solimine, and John Valauri for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
' Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 26 (1992).
2 The term "methodology" can have many meanings or dimensions. In this
Article, I use the term to describe the set of interpretive devices and conventions
that are commonly invoked to guide or inform efforts to determine the appropriate
meaning of a piece of legal (here, constitutional) text. A methodology will
represent an approach to a set of fundamental hermeneutic problems that are likely
to be relevant to the general practice of constitutional interpretation, such as the
appropriate role that the historical context or the framers' original understanding
should play in efforts to determine the meaning of constitutional texts. See
generally Richard B. Saphire, Originalism and the Importance of Constitutional
Aspirations, 24 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 599 (1997). It will also represent a response to
more specific issues that may vary from case to case. These include determining
which (typically three or four-part) "test," which categorical label (with its
attendant doctrines or tests), and which "standard of review" or level of judicial
scrutiny are appropriate for the case at hand. This Article will be concerned with
the second, more specific, set of methodological considerations.
'For example, in DenverArea Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), the Court had before it aFirst Amendment chal-
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choices, including her determination of which standards are applicable to
a particular issue and how they apply, can have very important implications
for the lawyers (and their clients) who appear in court to attack or defend
official action challenged on constitutional grounds. This is because the
choice among different methodologies, tests, or standards will often
influence, if it does not actually determine, the outcome of litigation.4 For
example, we may know from what the courts have said about a standard
lenge to several regulations of cable television promulgated by the Federal
Communication Commission (it struck down one and upheld two). As a threshold
matter, the Court confronted the question of which, if any, of the established First
Amendment "categorical standards" was the appropriate one to be applied in the
case. In a plurality opinion, Justice Breyer explicitly refused to apply any of the
Court's established standards: "[W]e believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively
to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now." Id. at 742. Instead, Breyer
set about creating a new one deemed appropriate to the special "environment" and
"context" of the regulations in question. In a separate opinion, Justice Kennedy
criticized Breyer for writing an opinion which "applies no standard, and by this
omission loses sight of existing First Amendment doctrine." Id. at 781. Kennedy
also criticized the plurality for "its evasion of any clear legal standard in deciding
[this case]." Id. at 784. (Later in his opinion, Kennedy claimed that Breyer had in
fact created a new First Amendment standard, which Kennedy proceeded to
criticize.) In Kennedy's view, "the creation of standards and adherence to them...
is the central achievement of our First Amendmentjurisprudence." Id. at 785. The
extended discussion and debate between Justices Breyer and Kennedy about the
identity and nature of the appropriate First Amendment standard suggests their
belief that the choice of standards entailed important theoretical and practical
consequences.
I Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, the battle over standards effectively may
become the central issue in a case. See Richard B. Saphire, The Search for
Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335,
350 (1981).
A recent case nicely illustrates this point. In Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
(1998), Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy,
concluded that a provision of federal immigration law which distinguished, for
purposes of determining eligibility for citizenship, between the child of an alien
father and citizen mother and the child of an alien mother and citizen father, did not
violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. However,
O'Connor disagreed with Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion of the Court,
about th6 relevant standard of review. According to O'Connor, Stevens applied the
so-called intermediate equal protection standard, whereas O'Connor believed that
"only rational basis scrutiny" was applicable. See id. at 452. O'Connor indicated
that had she concluded that intermediate (i.e., heightened) scrutiny was applicable,
she probably would have voted differently. See id. at 451-52.
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that they regard it as difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy.s Or we may be
able to infer from a series or pattern of court decisions that the application
of a particular standard will almost invariably lead to the rejection of a
constitutional challenge.
The choice of standards can also have broader, more theoretical
implications. For example, a judge's methodological choices-including
the sort of test or standard he or she believes is appropriate for a given
problem--can tell us much about that judge's general philosophy of
constitutional interpretation. It can provide a window into the judge's
thinking about overarching questions of judicial role-whether that judge
believes that the court should play a relatively active or passive role in
reviewing the decisions of government officials. 6 Moreover, the so-called
"rule of law" values of objectivity, consistency, and fair notice may be
furthered in constitutional law, if at all,7 through the creation and applica-
5 One thinks here about the observation that the Fourteenth Amendment
standard of "strict scrutiny" is "strict in theory but fatal in fact." Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
6 DenverArea Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996), is again illustrative. As noted earlier, see supra note 3, Justices
Breyer and Kennedy engaged in an extensive discussion and debate about the need
for and relevance of First Amendment standards. Justice Kennedy had much to say
about the general importance of standards to First Amendment interpretation. For
him, adherence to preestablished standards for analyzing First Amendment
problems was essential for preserving clarity and continuity in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Kennedy put it this way:
Standards are the means by which we state in advance how to test a law's
validity, rather than letting the height of the bar be determined by the
apparent exigencies of the day. They also provide notice and fair warning
to those who must predict how the courts will respond to attempts to
suppress their speech.
Id. at 785.
And Justice Kennedy also had a good deal to say about the particular
(non?)standard that Justice Breyer's plurality opinion ultimately articulated and
applied. He argued that the plurality's standard was both ambiguous and
manipulable-that its "words end up being a legalistic cover for an ad hoc
balancing ofinterests." Id. at 786. This criticism is shorthand for a general concern
about judicial role: that so-called "ad hoc balancing" entails the sort of
freewheeling and illegitimate discretion that unelected judges should avoid. See
gen era lly T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age ofBalancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
7 It appears to be the case that no one seriously believes in pure formalism any
longer. That is to say, no onebelieves that formal methodological structures created
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tion of methodological structures.' Absent such structures-and absent
some meaningful degree of stability in their maintenance and applica-
tion-there is little if any common basis for judges, lawyers, and others to
organize and direct their consideration of the meaning of many constitu-
tional provisions for individual cases.9
Given the importance of standards, the occasions on which the
Supreme Court signals its intent to alter a reigning standard or set of
standards should be viewed as significant events. The degree of signifi-
cance will depend upon a number of factors. A change may be dramatic or
modest; it may affect a broad area of constitutional jurisprudence or it may
have implications for a more discreet aspect of constitutional doctrine.'"
for, and applied to, the interpretation of constitutional texts completely eliminate
the "risk" of judicial discretion. (Whether the elimination, "complete" or not, of
discretion from thejudicial process is an unmitigated good is, ofcourse, atthe heart
of the debate over rules and standards to which I earlier referred.) But serious
arguments are advanced for the proposition that such structures can at least
minimize this risk. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw and the Law ofRules, 56
U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
' See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1307, 1366-67 (1995) (discussing demands on courts to provide guidance to
legal actors and referring to "the overwhelming use of multifactor tests or
formulaic standards as a means" to respond to that demand).
9 See Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to
the tiering ofequal protection methodology as "auseful prospective control device
of decisions by the lower federal courts"). For general discussion of the role that
standards and tests play in the operation ofa coherent and efficacious constitutional
regime, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1997). For a discussion of
how formal analytical structures can perform this function in a discrete area of First
Amendment jurisprudence, see Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public
Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 751-57 (1991).
" Take, for example, the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), where, for the first time in nearly sixty years, the
Court struck down an act of Congress on the grounds that it exceeded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. To the extent that the Court
altered its previously settled approach, its decision may turn out to be, in the words
of Justice Souter's dissent, "epochal," having far-ranging implications for the
future of the constitutional jurisprudence of federalism. Id. at 615 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Whether or not Lopez is properly understood in this way is already the
subject of vigorous debate. See Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez,
94 MICH. L. REv. 533 (1995) (containing a collection of articles commenting on
Lopez and its significance for constitutional federalism). For an indication that
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The change may be clear and acknowledged explicitly," or it may be
signaled more subtly or indirectly. Indeed, whether a case signals a
methodological shift may be a subject of some dispute, both within and
outside the Court."
In this Article, I consider the standards developed and applied by the
Supreme Court in determining whether government action violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 For the last
Lopez does notportend aradical change in Commerce Clause doctrine, see Condon
v. Reno, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the
federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act).
An example of a case which might be understood as revising an existing
methodology in a way likely to have a limited effect on constitutional doctrine is
Madsen v. Women's Health Centers, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). In upholding
certain aspects of a lower court's injunction limiting the expressive activity of
protesters at an abortion clinic, the Court adjusted its established standards for
assessing content-neutral regulations of speech in a way that reflected the need for
"somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment principles in
this context" Id. at 765 (citations omitted). Although a dissenting Justice Scalia
referred to the Court's modification of the established methodology as tantamount
to leaving "a powerful loaded weapon lying about," there has been no apparent
indication that Madsen is likely to have any wide-ranging effect on First
Amendmentjurisprudence. Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 An example of a clear and explicit change can be found in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528,531 (1985), where the Court
criticized and rejected the four-part test it had previously adopted in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and its progeny for determining
whether an exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
exceeded state sovereignty limits on that authority.
'
2 A number of recent decisions by the Court have either announced, or have
been taken to signal, significant methodological shifts. Others have sought to
clarify prior methodological uncertainty. Examples of the former include United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (modifying the decades-long paradigm for
assessing the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause), and
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (modifying prior First
Amendment, Free Exercise Clause analysis). Examples of the latter include
Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (signaling the
applicability of strict scrutiny equal protection analysis to all affirmative action
programs), and (at least arguably) Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (plurality opinion rejecting the framework of Roe v. Wade and establishing
an "undue burdens" test for analyzing the constitutionality of regulations of pre-
viability abortions).
'" The Supreme Court has applied equal protection principles to the federal
government under the auspices of the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment.
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twenty-five years, the basic methodological framework of equal protection
analysis has been well settled. In the usual case, the Court makes a
threshold determination of the appropriate standard of review it will apply
to the challenged classification. The choice is made from among three such
standards: rational basis scrutiny, 4 intermediate scrutiny,'5 and strict
scrutiny.' 6 Each level of scrutiny entails a prescribed test with increasingly
demanding requirements that must be satisfied if the challenged classifica-
tion is to withstand constitutional challenge.
This framework has been relatively stable, at least since the mid-1970s,
when the Supreme Court first articulated and applied the intermediate
standard to gender-based classifications. 7 This is not to say that the
framework has not been questioned or criticized."8 Justices from all sides
of the ideological spectrum have occasionally argued that trifurcated (or for
that matter, bifurcated) standards of review are not warranted by the
constitutional text, that they are not necessary to further the principles of
equal protection, or that they raise serious questions about the proper
judicial role.19 But because most of the Justices have been reasonably
satisfied with the framework, 0 or perhaps because they simply have been
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text
See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text ,
16 See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
"7 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court itself has traced the
origin of heightened scrutiny afforded gender-based classifications to 1971. See
J.E.B. v. Alabamaexrel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (citingReedv. Reed, 404 U.S.
71(1971)).
8 See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History ofModern Equal Pro-
tection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 246 (1991) (noting that the Court's "com-
partmentalizing approach [to equal protection analysis] has generated considerable
... dissent" inside the Court itself).
19 See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J,, dissenting) (arguing that the
adoption of an intermediate standard of review for gender classifications would,
among other things, "invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating
to particular types of legislation").
2 Standards of review (or the general framework they provide) in equal
protection jurisprudence, as elsewhere, may function as what Professor Sun-
stein has termed "incompletely theorized agreements." CAss R. SUNsTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND PoLmCAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996). These agreements
allow the Justices to decide a range of equal protection issues in a reasonably
satisfactory and coherent manner without having to resolve the even more complex
issues associated with the construction of a general theory of constitutional
equality.
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unable to agree on an alternate framework to take its place,2' there have
been few signs that it is likely to be abandoned.
To say that the framework has been reasonably stable, however, is not
to say that it has been completely free from flux and ambiguity. For
example, on occasion the "strictness" of strict scrutiny has been called into
question.' And recently, the Court has suggested that intermediate scrutiny
may actually have greater bite to it than previously had been thought.3
The "rational basis" standard has been perhaps the most stable of the
three. Arguably, rational basis (or "rationality") review represents the first
and oldest strand of modern equal protection analysis.24 It is also the most
basic. Unlike the other standards, it provides a requirement that all
classifications must satisfy if they are to pass the test of constitutional
validity.5 Thus, the rational basis test provides an important guidepost to
lawmakers who take seriously their prerogative and responsibility to enact
21 In a lecture given in 1975 or 1976, I heard Justice Blaclanun say that he
believed that a majority of his colleagues were troubled by the Court's tiered equal
protection methodology and that several of them would like to replace it with some
alternative framework if only they could agree upon one. For interesting insight
into a debate inside the Supreme Court about its equal protection methodology, see
Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1860 (1995) (concluding that, by the mid-1970s, "the Court
was hopelessly divided on equal protection theory, or at least on the verbal
formulations that conscientious Justices used to describe standards of review").
' See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995) (indicating
that strict scrutiny, contrary to a widely held view, was not necessarily "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact").
' See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556 (1996) (stating that inter-
mediate scrutiny requires that the state establish an "exceedingly persuasive
justification' for gender classifications). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 -ARv. L. REV. 4,
73 (1996) (claiming that Virginia "heightens the level of [intermediate] scrutiny
and brings it closer to the 'strict scrutiny' that is applied to discrimination on the
basis of race").
24 The standard has been traced back to at least 1897. See Robert W. Bennett,
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic
Theory, 67 CALiF. L. REv. 1049, 1052 (1979) (tracing the rational basis standard
to Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)).
' See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1068 (1979) ("Satisfaction of this 'rational
relationship' requirement is a necessary condition of constitutionality under equal
protection: no classification failing to satisfy the requirement is constitu-
tional .... ).
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constitutional laws, to judges who must determine the constitutionality of
enacted laws, to lawyers who advise their clients about the validity of
enacted laws, and to persons who are subject to laws whose constitutional-
ity they may wish to question.
The rational basis test, as a general matter, entails a significant degree
of judicial deference. In Part II, I discuss the modem framework for equal
protection analysis and situate rational basis review within that framework.
Part II then identifies an important Supreme Court decision, Williamson v.
Lee Optical,26 as establishing a paradigm for rational basis review,
examines the degree of judicial deference embodied in that paradigm, and
briefly discusses several cases which have represented deviations from the
paradigm. Part Im focuses on the United States Supreme Court's 1985
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.2" While
Cleburne purported to apply rational basis review, both its explication and
application of the rational basis standard proved difficult to square with the
sort of judicial deference that the paradigm clearly requires. The conspicu-
ousness of the Court's departure from the rationality paradigm raised
questions concerning the continued integrity of the paradigm itself. Part III
assesses the reaction to Cleburne. It traces developments in the lower
federal courts to determine whether those courts interpreted Cleburne as
destabilizing the general equal protection framework or its rational basis
component. Part III finds evidence of such a destabilizing effect in the
years immediately following Cleburne. This effect is illustrated principally
through an examination of Cleburne's application in several cases
challenging the military's power to discharge gay and lesbian servicemen
and women.
However, evidence of Cleburne's destabilizing effect on equal
protection analysis was mixed. That is, while some courts understood
Cleburne to either require or permit the sort of meaningful judicial scrutiny
that the established rationality paradigm precluded, others did not. At least
this was the situation until the early 1990s when the Supreme Court, in a
series of cases, revisited the fundamental nature of rational basis review.
Part IV examines one of these cases, Heller v. Doe,2" in which the Court
articulated and applied a rational basis standard that appeared to be every
bit as deferential as the one established in Lee Optical. Part V then
considers whether and the extent to which Heller actually reinstated or
reconfirmed the rational basis paradigm that Cleburne had at least arguably
26Wlliamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 438 (1955).
27City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
28 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
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unsettled. Here, a return to the gay rights area again proves instructive. An
analysis of gay rights cases decided after Heller strongly suggests that
Heller has inflicted severe damage to any Cleburne-esque strategy for
infusing into rational basis review any meaningful constraining force. Part
VI takes stock of the rational basis standard in the post-Heller era. While
Heller leaves open at least the theoretical possibility for a successful equal
protection challenge to run-of-the-mill legislative classifications, today a
lawyer who mounts an equal protection challenge on the assumption that
a court will find such classifications constitutionally irrational is being, at
best, unrealistic.29
In this Article, I do not take a position on whether the death of
Cleburne as a source of serious rational basis scrutiny is a good or bad
thing. As I note in the Conclusion, the notion that the Equal Protection
Clause should stand as a meaningful barrier to the government's general
power to classify is not unproblematic. The Supreme Court has never
articulated a general theory of equal protection that would justify the
application of serious judicial scrutiny outside of the areas in which it has
found intermediate or strict scrutiny properly applicable.3" It is quite
mysterious why the Court, even after Heller, continues to maintain that the
Equal Protection Clause limits the government's power to classify across
the entire field of its regulatory authority when its rational basis standard
has so little constraining force.
II. THE MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK
AND THE RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT
A. The Lee Optical Paradigm
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
a state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
29 Of course, reliance on rational basis review under state equal protection
clauses may prove both more realistic and more promising. See, e.g., Warden v.
State Bar, 982 P.2d 154, 175-79 (Cal. 1999) (Brown, J., dissenting) (rejecting
extreme deference under the equal protection component of the California
Constitution).
30 Whether the Court has advanced a persuasive theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment that justifies the application of heightened scrutiny (at least outside of
racial classifications) in cases where it is officially operative is also an open
question. For a prominent argument that it has not, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989).
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protection of the laws."3' The clause has long been understood as embody-
ing the Constitution's principal and most general expression of the
requirement of equality under law.32 And while the core content of the
clause has been understood to embody a special concern for racial
equality,33 it has not been confined to matters of race.
The notion that the Equal Protection Clause is not limited to racial
discrimination, and that it applies to legislative classifications generally
raises a number of problems. Perhaps the most significant problem arises
from the realization that all (or at least practically all) legislation
classifies.34 Thus, no laws would be immune from potential constitutional
challenge.35 Perhaps that possibility would be less remarkable if the
constitutional materials provided some clear standard of equality according
to which laws must be evaluated. But efforts to discover such a standard
have been notoriously elusive.36 The task of identifying or constructing a
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32 Whether this understanding is correct has been the subject of a good deal of
recent scholarly attention, with some scholars suggesting that while the Equal
Protection Clause embodies a particular concern for specific kinds of unequal
treatment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is the proper locus in the
Fourteenth Amendment for a more general antidiscrimination principle. See
MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SUPREME CouRT 71-77 (1999); John C. Harrison, Restructuring the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALEL.J. 1385 (1992).33 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
" Equal protection analysis is not confined to formal legislation. All
government action, whether legislative, executive or judicial, is potentially subject
to the constraints, whatever they are, imposed by the principle of equal protection.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that, until recently, there was some degree of
uncertainty as to whether the Equal Protection Clause applied in cases where the
plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group. This issue was settled in
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000), where the Court,
in a per curiam opinion, held that the clause applies to a cause of action on behalf
of a "class of one."
31 On this point, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 3 0-32
(1980); Klarman, supra note 18, at 228 ("The Equal Protection Clause does not, as
the Court has so often announced, require universally equal treatment. Nor could
any practicable theory of equal protection do so, given that laws, by their very
nature, seek to differentiate.") (citation omitted).36 See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982) (arguing that equality is an intrinsically empty concept and that the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause can be ascertained only by reference to sources
external to the clause itself).
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standard generally has been left to the courts, and the judicial creation and
application of standards almost inevitably entails questions about the
political accountability ofjudges and the proper judicial role. If the courts
developed a general standard of equality that had meaningful bite, concern
would surely arise about the prospect ofjudges meddling uncontrollably in
the legislative process and "usurping" political prerogatives.37
Against this background, the courts, and particularly the United
States Supreme Court, have had to respond to a dilemma: how to take
seriously the constitutional injunction of equal protection without
eviscerating some meaningful distinction between judicial and legislative
functions. The response has been to separate equal protection problems into
different categories, and to calibrate the degree of judicial scrutiny
(and the degree of legislative accountability) accordingly. With respect
to classifications which seem to have been of most concern to the
creators of the Fourteenth Amendment-those based on race38-the
Supreme Court has been especially demanding. Racial classifications are
subject to "strict scrutiny"; they are presumed unconstitutional and can be
sustained only where the state can demonstrate that they are necessary to
further a compelling government interest. 39 In addition, the Court has
extended strict scrutiny to classifications that implicate so-called "funda-
mental interests."'
In recent times, the Court has indicated its willingness to apply
meaningful scrutiny to at least some classifications that are based neither
upon race nor some other "suspect" trait and that do not implicate
fundamental interests. The paradigm for this category of equal protection
37 See, e.g., THE END OF DEMOCRACY? (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997).
31 Whether the Fourteenth Amendment was directed at all forms of racial
discrimination or only selected instances has been the subject of a longstanding,
ongoing, and probably interminable debate. See, e.g., RAoUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977); Harrison, supra note 32; PERRY, supra note 32.
" See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). But see Klarman, supra
note 18 (indicating that this has not always been the case). Classifications that are
viewed as functionally equivalent to racial classifications-those that the Court
concludes are "suspect," according to a methodology first suggested in the famous
"footnote four" of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)-may, in theory, also be subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (addressing alienage).
o See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(discussing the right to vote in state elections).
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cases is gender discrimination.4 1 Where laws classify on the basis of
gender, the Court has applied what has been called "intermediate
scrutiny."42 The most common formulation of this standard carries with it
a presumption of the law's unconstitutionality that can be rebutted only if
the government can establish that the classification is "substantially"
related to an "important" (and, of course, an otherwise constitutionally
legitimate) government interest.43 While the Court has shown little
inclination to formally expand the area in which intermediate scrutiny
operates, 4 it has not expressed any intention to abandon it as a distinct
element of equal protection methodology.
Of course, statutes that classify on the basis of race, gender, or other
traits which might formally trigger strict or intermediate scrutiny constitute
a quite small percentage of the universe of laws to be found in state and
federal codes. The vast majority of legislation operates in an area that has
been referred to as social and economic welfare or policy.45 And social or
41 This standard, or at least something close to it, has been applied, at least on
occasion, in other, limited equal protection contexts. See, e.g., Regents ofthe Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring inpart and
dissenting in part) (discussing affirmative action); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (addressing illegitimacy).
42 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982). For a recent discussion of this standard, see Jay D.
Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as JudicialMinimalism,
66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 298 (1998).43 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
" In Cleburne, the Court rejected the court of appeals's conclusion that
classifications based upon mental retardation were "quasi-suspect," and thus, like
gender, subjectto intermediate scrutiny. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. Since then,
no Court majority has formally applied intermediate scrutiny in an equal protection
case outside of gender.
This is not to say that selected equal protection cases cannot plausibly be
understood as surreptitious applications of intermediate scrutiny. For example, in
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court invalidated Texas laws denying free
public education to the noncitizen children of undocumented aliens. While the
majority formally rejected arguments that the challenged classification was either
suspect or that it implicated a fundamental interest and should therefore be
seriously scrutinized, the case sometimes has been taken to represent a de facto
application of intermediate scrutiny. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive
Equal Protection?, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 167.
4 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(discussing the standard to be applied in "areas of social and economic policy");
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 60 (arguing that rational basis review is applicable to
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economic legislation does not warrant the formal application of strict or
intermediate scrutiny.46 Instead, the Court will apply what is commonly
called the "rational basis" standard.
The rational basis standard has been the most durable component of
equal protection analysis.47 It traces its modem origin to the Court's
decision during the mid-1930s to withdraw from the highly interventionist
posture taken in Lochner v. New York 48 It has come to embody the notion
that most legislation is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality
and that, all things considered, the judicial invalidation of social and
economic legislation should be an exceptional event. 49
An influential case symbolizing the degree of deference to legislative
judgments embodied in the rational basis standard is Williamson v. Lee
"garden-variety socioeconomic legislation").
4 The rationales for deciding the proper standard of review to apply in a given
case are often complex and still subjectto considerable dispute. In the case of racial
discrimination, no one today seriously disputes the appropriateness of strict
scrutiny. Given general agreement that a concern for race lies at the historical core
of the Fourteenth Amendment, few believe that strictly scrutinizing most racial
classifications requires any deep theoretical justification. In the case of nonracial
classifications, however, the grounds for deciding which standard to apply have
been, and remain, the subject of considerable theoretical debate. The theories that
probably have had the greatest influence on the development of modem equal
protection doctrine and methodology have been derived from the famous "footnote
four" of UnitedStates v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For
the most notable and influential analysis, see ELY, supra note 35.
41 See Bennett, supra note 24, at 1052. Robert Bennett traced the rationality
requirement to 1897.
48 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The story of Lochner and its
effect on the development of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine has been recounted
in many places. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,760-61 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.
S. 833, 861-63 (1992) (plurality opinion); Klarman, supra note 18; Ira C. Lupu,
Untangling the Strands ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,991-
97 (1979).
" Chief Justice Rehnquist, a leading proponent for an exceptionally deferential
rational bases standard, once asserted that the standard should "virtually foreclose
judicial invalidation except in the rare, rare case where the legislature has all but
run amok and acted in a patently arbitrary manner." Tushnet, supra note 21, at
1857 (quoting Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice William J.
Brennan (Jan. 30, 1976), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, box
165, file 8).
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Optical.50 At issue in Lee Optical was the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute that regulated the eye care industry. The law required that, of all eye
care professionals who fitted or duplicated glasses, only opticians (and not,
for example, ophthalmologists, optometrists, and the sellers of ready-to-
wear glasses) were required to have a prescription. In rejecting the
opticians' equal protection and due process challenges to the law, the Court
said "it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages" 51 of the law's requirements. The Court dismissed the claim
that the law's distinction was impermissibly discriminatory by noting that
"[tihe problem of legislative classification is a perennial one"'52 and that
legislative "reform may take one step at a time."53 It concluded that "[t]he
prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the
invidious discrimination,"' 4 which it "cannot say... [had] been reached
here. '55 In essence, the Court took the position that it would tolerate
significant imperfections in legislative classification.
In the portion of its opinion devoted to the analysis (and rejection) of
the opticians' due process challenge, the Court gave further notice of the
deference owed the legislature in Fourteenth Amendment challenges to
social and economic legislation.s6 If a rationality requirement entails an
51 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U. S. 483 (1955). Lee Optical is sometimes
taken to represent a paradigm of rational basis review, and is often cited in judicial
opinions. See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text,
83 VA. L. REv. 493, 500 n.26 (1997) (referring to Lee Optical as "[t]he classic
citation" for the rational relationship standard); Bennett, supra note 24, at 1053
n.22 (referring to Lee Optical as "[a] famous example" of rational basis review).
In a recent article, Peter Irons refers to Lee Optical as a "rather obscure, and
certainly not momentous, case," but goes on to discuss the extent to which "it has
become Justice Rehnquist's favorite precedent" in a wide range of individual rights
cases. Peter Irons, Opticians and Abortion: The Constitutional Myopia ofJustice
Rehnquist, 22 NOVA L. REV. 695, 697 (1998).
51 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487.
52 Id. at 489.
53 Id.
54Id.
55Id.
56 Professor Irons has recently emphasized that Lee Optical itself spoke of
judicial deference to legislative judgments in the areas of "business and industrial
conditions." Irons, supra note 50, at 700. It was apparently not until 1970 that the
Court redefined and expanded the area of judicial deference to "social and
economic" legislation. See id. at 700-02 (describing the expansion ofLee Optical's
zone of deference in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
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assessment of the relationship of a classification to a legislative goal, 7 then
the rationality of a particular statute cannot be evaluated without at least
some sense of the goal that it was thought to further. In Lee Optical, the
Court felt obliged to address the opticians' argument that the Oklahoma
law requiring the production of a prescription for fitting glasses or
replacing old prescriptions could not be explained by reference to a number
of purposes it might have been reasonable to suppose the law was enacted
to further. If the Court was concerned with whether the law was in fact a
rational way to further one or more of the purposes for which it was
enacted, one might have expected it to determine what those purposes
actually were and to evaluate the law in light of them. But instead of
attempting to discern the actual goals that led the legislature to enact the
law, the Court engaged in unsupported speculation about what those goals
might have been.58 Since every classification is likely to be at least
plausibly (if only imperfectly) related to some goal that a legislature
legitimately might seek to further, the Court's willingness to hypothesize
one or more such goals drained the rationality requirement of much, and
perhaps of any, meaningful content. 9
It is difficult to overstate but, for purposes of this Article important to
emphasize, the degree of judicial deference entailed in Lee Optical-style
rational basis review. First, it might be helpful to understand the sort of
questions that a court applying the standard should not ask. These include:
(1) whether the classification represented a good, wise, or sensible way to
further a legislative goal;6° (2) whether the statute was an effective or
efficient way to further a legislative goal,6 or whether, in a qualitative or
5 See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model,
36 UCLA L. REv. 447, 460 (1989).
58 See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487. For example, the Court noted that "the
legislature may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical, not only for
correction of vision but also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every
change in frames and every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a
prescription from a medical expert." Id. (emphasis added).
9 The Court's willingness to hypothesize legislative goals has been the subject
of a good deal of criticism. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) ("[The] rational-
basis standard... does not allow [the Court] to substitute [its] personal notions of
good public policy for those of Congress.").
61 For a discussion of the role that efficiency might play in a rationality
standard, see Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN.
L. REv. 1 (1980).
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quantitative sense, the statute was "reasonable"; 62 (3) whether there were
other ways to further relevant legislative goals that would have imposed
less restriction on the individual interests implicated by the statute;63 and
(4) whether, given the information available to the court, the judge could
conclude independently that the statute was a rational way to further a
legislative goal.64 What the judge does ask is something like this: Given the
information that was actually before the legislature, or information that
might have been available to the legislature, or information which the
legislature reasonably might have thought existed, or information of which
the court can take judicial notice, could the legislature conceivably have
believed (not did it actually believe) that this statute would or might, even
if only in the most remote or tenuous way, further or promote a legitimate
actual or hypothetical goal? If the answer is yes, the statute stands. And,
not surprisingly, in a long line of cases applying the standard,65 the answer
has been yes.
The extreme judicial deference represented by this standard has been
noted both within and outside the Court. Justice Brennan once referred
pejoratively to the standard as "tautological."66 Recently, a majority of the
Court referred to the standard as a "paradigm of judicial restraint."67 And
even more recently, Justice Breyer referred to it as "specially lenient."68
62 One can find equal protection cases where the standard is formulated in terms
of the "reasonableness," as opposed to the rationality, of a classification. See
Bennett, supra note 24, at 1049 n.2. But the Court has been quite clear that it is not
using reasonableness in the qualitative, all-things-considered sense. See, e.g.,
Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 234.
63 The inquiry into the existence of so-called "less restrictive alternatives" is
reserved for strict scrutiny. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
' See, e.g., Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 235 ("As long as the classificatory scheme
chosen by Congress rationally advances a reasonable and identifiable governmental
objective, [the Court] must disregard the existence of other methods of allocation
that [the Justices], as individuals, perhaps would have preferred.").
65 Among the most prominent and frequently cited of these are United States
R.R. RetirementBd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297 (1976); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976);
Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
6Fritz, 449 U.S. at 186.
67 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
68 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 481 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). On a
somewhat more colorful note, one judge recently referred to the rational basis
[VOL. 88
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER, INC.
Scholars have also commented on its softness. In one of the most influen-
tial discussions of modem equal protection, Professor Gunther observed
that the "'mere rationality' requirement symbolized virtual judicial
abdication."'69 Writing in the same forum, Professor Fallon opined that
"judicial scrutiny under rational basis review is typically so deferential as
to amount to a virtual rubber stamp."70
But a "virtual" rubber stamp is not necessarily the same as the real
thing. If the rational basis standard always operated in a true Lee Optical
way, one might think that it would belie the conventional understanding
that the Equal Protection Clause is not limited to race but applies to the
entire universe of legislative classifications. For if the rationality standard
were always outcome-determinative--if its invocation and application
always led to the validation of classifications-it would make the clause,
in areas where the standard applied, legally superfluous.7 And this would
have important practical consequences. If lawyers believed that a rational
basis test could never be successfully invoked to strike down classifica-
tions, assertion of an equal protection claim where there were no reason-
able grounds for triggering some form of heightened judicial scrutiny might
well amount to legal malpractice.
B. Deviations from the Rationality Paradigm
If there were no reason to believe that rational basis review could ever
lead to the invalidation of legislative action, then one might say the area in
standard as "an effete standard of review." Warden v. State Bar, 982 P.2d 154, 170
(1999), reh'g denied (Oct. 20, 1999), and petition for cert. filed (Jan. 14, 2000)
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Another has referred to it as "anything goes" review. Id.
at 176 (Brown, J., dissenting).
69 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1972).70 Fallon, supra note 9, at 79. See also Irons, supra note 50, at 700 (observing
that the Lee Optical-style rational basis test "is virtually impossible to flunk").
71 Of course, there is always the possibility that legislatures would treat the
Court's deferential rational basis as an example ofan "underenforced constitutional
norm," and that, in the process of exercising their responsibility to act
constitutionally, they would apply it more rigorously than would the Supreme
Court. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1977-78). But see
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (adopting a restrictive view of
Congress's power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment).
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which it operated was essentially an equal protection free zone. But while
the vast majority of cases still reflect the Lee Optical paradigm, the
Supreme Court occasionally has invalidated classifications notwithstanding
its formal invocation of the rationality standard. And the cases that appear
to have deviated froin the rationality paradigm have arisen frequently
enough to cause a stir, in constitutional circles.72
The principal exceptions to the rationality paradigm might loosely be
categorized in the following way: one type consists of the case that turns
out to be a forerunner for the formal establishment of a new standard of
review, or for the extension of an existing standard to a new context;73 a
second type consists of a series of cases which, in addition to implicating
the equality concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment, also implicate other
constitutional values;74 a third, and perhaps the most prominent, type
consists of cases where the Court has concluded that the challenged
classification could not fairly be thought to serve a legitimate public
purpose. In the third type of case, the Court has found that the only
plausible way to characterize the challenged statute was as an effort to
disadvantage a group because of prejudice toward its members.75
72 While Supreme Court cases that seem to deviate from the Lee Optical model
generally have been widely scattered, Professor Gunther's analysis discussed seven
such cases decidedwithin a single Term (1971). See Gunther, supra note 69, at 18
n.88.
73 As it turns out, there may be only one case that clearly meets this description.
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed invalidated an Idaho policy preferring
men over women in the appointment of administrators of estates. Reed is widely
viewed as a precursor to Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court
first articulated the intermediate standard of review applicable to gender
discrimination.
, The Court has, while applying rational basis review, invalidated classi-
fications that have implicated the values of federalism. See, e.g., Hooper v.
Bemalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). It has been
suggested that the Court's departure from the Lee Optical paradigm in these cases
can be explained by the presence of the sort of antidiscrimination concerns that
have led it to employ vigorous means-ends scrutiny in so-called dormant
Commerce Clause cases. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 59.
1 A leading case here is United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973), vhere the Court struck down the so-called "apti-hippie"
amendment to the federal food stamp program, and where it announced the
principle "that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 534 (emphasis in original).
The Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), where it
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Some have taken these nonparadigratic cases to reflect nothing more
or less than the give-and-take that is often said to characterize the common
law nature of constitutional decision making within the Supreme Court.76
Others have suggested the possibility that some fluctuation in the applica-
tion of standards like the rational basis requirement reflects the inevitable
consequence of camouflaged disagreements entailed in the Justices'
acceptance of "doctrinal structures that they regard as less than optimal.""
Still others have seen in these cases the possibility of serious dissatisfaction
with the entire three-tiered equal protection framework and the suggestion
that the framework is in danger of serious erosion or collapse.
Whether these exceptions to the highly deferential Lee Optical rational
basis standard represent more than unexplainable aberrations is, for present
purposes, less important than what they signify for the practical realities
facing lawyers and judges who must employ and apply equal protection
doctrine. As will be noted later, the Court has left little doubt that Lee
Optical lives,78 and that where it applies, real deference is the order of the
day. But the dominance of Lee Optical has, on occasion, been placed in
question. The next Part considers one of the most important of these
occasions: the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne.v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.7
9
m. RATIONALITY REVIEW AND LEuR NE
Cleburne involved a challenge to the refusal of the City of Cleburne,
Texas to permit the owners of land to use it for the purpose of operating a
struck down an anti-gay amendment to the Colorado Constitution, has been
understood as an application of the Moreno exception to the rational basis
paradigm. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 59-64.
76 See Gunther, supra note 69, at 36 (referring to the Court's application of
"intensified rationality scrutiny" in the 1971 Term as "inchoate and fragmentary").
77Fallon, supra note 9, at 59. The point here seems to be that the Justices, for
strategic or institutional reasons, will sometimes settle on doctrinal formulations
that they regard as suboptimal. These formulations may be seen as working well
enough in most cases to whicl they are likely to be applied, but are subject to some
manipulation where their consistent application would lead to clearly unacceptable
results.
781 do not mean to suggest that the Lee Optical case itself is still regarded as the
most compelling precedent for rational basis review. Indeed, it is possible that Lee
Optical has been superceded or supplanted by more recent precedent embodying
the same or closely analogous concept ofjudicial deference. See infra Part VI.
79City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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group home for the mentally retarded. Pointing to the fact that other
multiresident uses of property in the area were permitted, the landowners
claimed that the refusal to permit their intended multiresidential use
violated their rights to equal protection. The federal district court found that
permission to use the land would have been granted but for the fact that the
potential residents were mentally retarded." But since it concluded that
there was no basis for applying any sort of heightened judicial scrutiny to
a law that classified on the basis of mental retardation, the court felt
compelled to apply rational basis scrutiny and upheld the city's action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a unani-
mous decision, reversed." The court agreed with the district court that
classifications based on mental retardation were not "suspect"; therefore,
the fact that the excluded use would house mentally retarded persons
provided no basis for evaluating the city's action under full-blown strict
scrutiny.82 But the court "conclude[d] that although mental retardates are
not a suspect class, they do share enough of the characteristics of a suspect
class to warrant heightened scrutiny." 3 Applying an intermediate standard
of review, the court found that the restriction of group homes for the
mentally retarded did "not substantially further any important governmen-
tal interests,"" and that it was therefore unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court agreed that the application of the Cleburne
ordinance was unconstitutional. It disagreed, however, with much of the
court of appeals's reasoning. In particular, the Court disagreed with the
Fifth Circuit concerning the applicability of heightened scrutiny. It found
that the factors that had led it to apply strict scrutiny to other classifications
were not present in the case of mental retardation.85 Moreover, the Court
expressed concern that, were it to attach "quasi-suspect" status to laws that
disadvantaged the mentally retarded, it would be hard-pressed to find a
principled basis for refusing to extend the same status, and the heightened
scrutiny it entailed, to a wide range of other classifications. 6
80 See id. at 437.
81 See Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
82 See id. at 195-200. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, under the Supreme
Court's "formulaic analysis," mental retardation did not qualify as a suspect
classifying trait83 Id. at 197. The court held that "mentally retarded persons are only a 'quasi-
suspect' class." Id. at 198.
' Id. at 200. The court also found that some of the interests asserted by the City
of Clebume were not constitutionally legitimate. See id. at 202.85See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-47.
86See id. at 446 ("We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to
do so.").
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According to the Court's established equal protection methodology, the
rejection of heightened scrutiny left only the rational basis standard to
apply. And this is what the Court purported to do.87 The central issue posed,
according to the Court, was whether the city may "require the permit for
this facility when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely
permitted?""8 But, contrary to what one might have expected had it applied
the sort of scrutiny suggested by the Lee Optical notion of rationality, the
Court concluded that the City of Cleburne's exclusion of the group home
(while permitting other similar facilities) was not supported by a rational
basis. The Court reached this conclusion on two grounds.
First, the city defended its action, in part, on the basis of objections of
some people in the area to having mentally retarded people living in their
midst. The Court found that, to the extent the city's action was based upon
naked prejudice, fear, or ill will toward the mentally retarded, it did not
further a legitimate governmental interest.8 9 As noted earlier, the Court had
already held that it would not uphold classifications of this sort, regardless
of how "rational" they might otherwise appear to be.90
The Court then turned to several other interests advanced by the city.
Although it did not question the legitimacy of these interests, it found that
87 See id. ("To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.").
181d. at 448.
89 See id. ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect") (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). The Court's reasoning applied to the city's claims that the
denial of the permit was justified by reference to the "negative attitudes" of nearby
property owners and to the fear that students in a nearby junior high school might
harass the mentally retarded occupants of the group home.
91 See supra note 75. The vitality of this exception to the "normal" application
of rational basis review was more recently reflected in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996). In Romer, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution that denied gays the right to invoke normal lawmaking processes to
obtain protection against various forms of discrimination. Its decision rested, in
part, on its conclusion that the provision was based on animosity towards gays, and
thus was not supported by a legitimate purpose. For general discussions of Romer,
see CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 137-62 (1999); Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better Boring and
Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Exercise of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis,
68 U. CoLo. L. REv. 335 (1997); Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin,
49 STAN. L. REv. 45 (1996).
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the exclusion of the group home was not a rational way to further any of
them. For example, the city claimed that the exclusion of the group home
was justified because of its concern that the home would be "located on 'a
five hundred year flood plain.' ,91 It also sought to defend its action based
on its concern "about the legal responsibility for actions which the mentally
retarded might take."'92 In addition, the city tried to justify its action based
on a concern about the number of people that might occupy the dwelling,
and because of its desire to avoid a "concentration of population" and
"congestion of the streets."93
Under Lee Optical, one might well have expected the Court to find
these arguments sufficient to uphold the city's action. Initially, it is
important to recall that true rational basis review entails a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality and places a heavy burden on the challenger to
demonstrate the "irrationality" of the classification. 94 Since the classifica-
tion is presumed to be rational, the courts assume that the challenged
classification is, in fact, supported by a legitimate purpose and that the
legislature might have concluded that the classification bears some
relationship to the accomplishment of that purpose. Thus, in the ordinary
case, the Court has not required, and there is no need for, the defenders of
a classification to identify or articulate purposes, whether actual or
possible, that a classification might have been thought to further.95 In
9 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
92 Id
.
93 Id. at 450.
94 See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184
(1980).
95While the defenders of a classification subject to rational basis review are not
required, in the record or otherwise, to establish the actual purpose(s) the
classification was enacted to further, they are not precluded from doing so. There
are many reasons why lawyers defending legislation might feel inclined, even ifnot
obliged, to establish the existence of purposes that might have prompted a rational
legislative body (and rational legislators) to act the way it did. After all, a
legislature enacting a law for no reason might fairly be accused of acting
irresponsibly, and who would freely want to concede or admit to that? Moreover,
the Court's rational basis review has been so deferential that, in theory, it is almost
always possible to point to some legitimate purpose that a statute might in some
way have been thought to further. Thus, there seems to be no real downside to
defending a statute by arguing that it actually did further some purpose that some
legislators might have had in mind, as opposed to simply leaving it up to the court
to hypothesize a purpose. It should therefore not be surprising that there are few,
if any, equal protection cases where the state has offered no (at least arguably)
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addition, Lee Optical contemplates that the government can address
problems "one step at a time."96 Consequently, not every person or group
who otherwise might be viewed as "similarly situated" with respect to a
given problem-say, exposure to the risks of living near a flood plain, or
contributing to population density-must be treated in the same way. The
theory seems to be that the government need not approach regulation on an
all-or-nothing basis, that it has to start someplace, and that (at least where
rational basis review applies) no group can complain that the government
started with that group.
It was therefore odd for the Court to conclude that "[b]ecause in our
view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the
Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate
interests,"97 the city's action violated equal protection. First, the failure of
the city to establish in the record a basis for treating the owners of property
designated to house the mentally retarded differently from the owners of
other property should have been irrelevant. As the Court has recently noted,
a state "has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of
a statutory classification." ' Second, the Court's suggestion that it was
incumbent on the city to establish that the proposed group home would
present a special threat to the city's interests-a threat not posed by other
plausible explanation for a challenged classification.
96 Wiliamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955). See also GreaterNew
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1936 (1999) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring) (citing Lee Optical for proposition that, "[w]ere Congress to
undertake substantive regulation of the gambling industry," it would, under the
"one step at a time" principle, be accorded considerable judicial deference).
9' Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
98 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); see also FCC v. Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. 307,315 (1993) (noting that "the absence of 'legislative
facts' explaining the distinction 'on the record'... has no significance in rational-
basis analysis") (citation omitted). This is not to say that where the state has
introduced evidence to support the rationality of a classification, the Court will
refuse to consider the record. Indeed, in Lee Optical itself, the Court noted that
"[flor all this record shows, the ready-to-wear branch of [the eyeglass] business
may not loom large in Oklahoma or may present problems of regulation distinct
from the other branch."Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at489. Butthe Court's emphasis that
the rationality of the Oklahoma statute might be supported by reasons the Court
itself was apparently willing to hypothesize belied the notion that the existence of
a record (either legislative or evidentiary) from which the rationality of a
classification could actually be established was aprerequisite to the classification's
successful defense.
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permitted property uses in the area-was also difficult to square with the
prevailing understanding of rational basis review. The "one step at a time"
approach of Lee Optical was based on the notion that "[t]he problem of
legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire
definition," 9 and that the legislature could assume that even "[e]vils in the
same field"'l could properly be treated differently.
That the Cleburne Court's application of rational basis review
represented a marked deviation from the deferential paradigm was the
principal theme of Justice Marshall's separate opinion. 01 Marshall argued
that "Cleburne's ordinance [had been] invalidated only after being
subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with height-
ened scrutiny.""1 2 Marshall continued:
To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny,
and perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called "second
order" rational-basis review rather than "heightened scrutiny." But
however labeled, the rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly
not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical... 103
After noting some of the ways in which the Court's analysis deviated
from true rational basis review, Marshall identified problems he thought
might be caused by the Court's lack of candor. First, it "create[d] precedent
for this Court and lower courts to subject economic and commercial
classifications to similar and searching 'ordinary' rational basis review.""
Second, Marshall argued that "by failing to articulate the factors that justify
[its] 'second order' rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled
foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to be
invoked."'0 5 According to Marshall, lower courts would be "left in the
dark' 0 6 about these questions; "the Court's freewheeling, and potentially
"Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489.
100 Id.
101 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice Marshall's
opinion.
12Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'o
3 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104 Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Marshall
described this prospect as "a small and regrettable step back toward the days of
Lochner v. New York." Id.
'os Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Io d. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dangerous, rational-basis standard"107 essentially provided little guidance
to those charged with applying it, thus undermining a major reason for its
"focusing obsessively on the appropriate label to give its standard of
review."108
Most commentators have generally agreed with Marshall's character-
ization of Cleburne 's version of rational basis review. In a recent, extensive
analysis of intermediate equal protection scrutiny, Professor Wexler
referred to Cleburne-style scrutiny as "a very heightened form of rational-
ity review, which scholars have likened to a de facto intermediate scrutiny
standard."'" Dean Sullivan characterized it as an "escalate[d]" version of
"nominal rationality review,"'10 while Professor Klarman called Cleburne
a case "in which the Court mouthed rationality language while surrepti-
tiously substituting a heightened review standard."' '
But while there seems to be a consensus that Cleburne-style rationality
review really does entail some meaningful degree ofjudicial scrutiny, there
is less certainty about what role, if any, it has played in the subsequent
development of equal protection doctrine. Justice Marshall's concern was
that the Court's infusion of real bite into the rational basis standard might
have the effect of destabilizing equal protection doctrine. 12 Lower court
judges and lawyers would be uncertain whether the "ordinary" ("first
order") rationality was required in a given situation, or whether "height-
ened" ("second order") rationality was appropriate. And even worse,
Marshall warned the doctrinal fluidity associated with this situation might
embolden activist judges to selectively invoke heightened rationality to
strike down government action of which they personally disapproved."'
Have Justice Marshall's fears materialized? Has Cleburne destabilized
equal protection doctrine, either by altering its structure or creating
significant uncertainties and inconsistencies in its application? And in more
"o7 Id. at 478 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
..
8 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Wexler, supra note 42, at 317 n.123.
1o Sullivan, supra note 1, at 61 n.248.
".' Klarman, supra note 18, at 234.
"
2 Of course, the "sliding scale" equal protection methodology that Marshall
himself proposed, in Cleburne and elsewhere, had its own destabilizing potential.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (advocating a sliding scale equal protection methodology).
113 Professor Sunstein has observed that Cleburne is one ofseveral rational basis
cases that "reflect the possible use of rationality review as a kind of magical trump
card, or perhaps joker, hidden in the pack and used on special occasions." Sunstein,
supra note 23, at 61.
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practical terms, has Cleburne altered the landscape of equal protection law
facing lawyers contemplating challenges to government action where there
is little or no hope of successfully triggering anything more than rational
basis review? It is to these questions that I now turn.
IV. THE FATE OF CLEBURNE
A. First Impressions
Before assessing Cleburne's impact, it is important to recall the two
ways in which the case departed from the Lee Optical rational basis
paradigm. First, the Court concluded that even where rational basis is
applicable, a classification will violate equal protection where the
disadvantage imposed on the disfavored class can be explained only by
prejudice. That is, where a court is convinced that the legislature disadvan-
taged a group because it desired to harm its members, it will always
invalidate. Such a legislative purpose is per se unconstitutional.14 Second,
even accepting that the classification served some legitimate legislative
purpose, the Court was willing to question its instrumental rationality. It
was not willing to assume or accept at face value the government's
representations that the classification actually furthered those purposes in
some "rational" way."'
There is little question that Cleburne, understood as a prohibition
against classifications explainable by prejudice alone, is alive and well." 6
Cleburne frequently has been cited by lower courts as authority for striking
down classifications found to be explainable only in terms of the prejudice
"
4 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Whether this represented a
true departure from Lee Optical may be open to question. There, the Court had no
reason to conclude that the Oklahoma legislature intended to disadvantage the
disfavored opticians out of pure animosity or prejudice. Even if the Court had
concluded that the Oklahoma statute was nothing but "special interest' legislation,
the result of a political battle between "rent seeking" groups in economic
competition with each other, there is little reason to believe it would have struck
it down. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP.
CT. REv. 397. But to the extent that the Lee Opticalparadigm has been understood
as an effective abdication of judicial power, the Cleburne Court's willingness to
even engage in serious scrutiny of legislative ends can be viewed as remarkable.
" 
5 See supra notes 98-99.
16 Indeed, the Court had already established this principle in-the Moreno case,
which it cited in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (citing U.S. Dept. ofAgric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
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or animosity of the enacting body."17 As Judge Posner recently explained,
citing Cleburne:
If a law is challenged as a denial of equal protection, and all that the
government can come up with in defense of the law is that the people who
are hurt by it happen to be irrationally hated or irrationally feared by a
majority of voters, it is difficult to argue that the law is rational if
"rational" in this setting is to mean anything more than democratic
preference. And it must mean something more if the concept of equal
protection is to operate, in accordance with its modem interpretations, as
a check on majoritarianism.1 8
It is with respect to Cleburne's second departure from Lee Optical-the
infusion of meaningful scrutiny into the rational basis test's means-ends
analysis-that its legacy is less certain. As Justice Marshall's dissent
predicted, inthe years immediately following Cleburne, some lower federal
courts clearly understood the case as infusing the rational basis standard
with real content. For example, one court referred to Cleburne as evincing
"a trend of the court to go beyond the asserted justifications [offered in
defense of a classification] and to carefully focus on the relationship
between the legislative ends and means.""' 9 Another court saw in Cleburne
... See, e.g., Sullivan v. Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1987) (invalidating
a denial of a conditional use permit for a home for recovering alcoholics found to
have been motivated by fear); United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir.
1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing Cleburne for the proposition that the
"usually deferential 'rational basis' test has been applied with greater rigor in some
contexts, particularly those in which courts have had reason to be concerned about
possible discrimination!); Oxford House v. Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1343
n.19 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting that the justifications for the zoning ordinance and its
application could be found "irrational" under Cleburne); Casa Marie, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 752 F. Supp. 1152 (D.P.R. 1990) (invalidating the application of
a zoning ordinance to a group home for the mentally disabled found to have been
motivated by prejudice), vacated by 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993); Burstyn v.
Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (invalidating a city zoning
ordinance placing restrictions on adult congregate living facilities, in part because
of a finding that it was enacted out of fear and prejudice); Marks v. City Council
of Chesapeake, 723 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D. Va. 1988) (invalidating a denial of a
conditional use permit sought by a palm reader, in partbecause of a finding that the
denial was motivated by fear).
1 8 Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 1998).
". Burstyn v. Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 533 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
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indications of "an alteration of the rational basis test ' 120 and viewed it as
precedent for the proposition that "[t]he Supreme Court is now applying the
rational basis test more stringently than in the past." '' Yet another court,
while refusing an invitation to apply a true "second order" rational basis
review as suggested by Justice Marshall's dissent, nonetheless saw
Cleburne as endorsing a more "modest proposition that the simple
articulation of a justification for a challenged classification does not
conclude the judicial inquiry."'"
One case decided shortly after Cleburne nicely illustrates the extent to
which Cleburne was viewed as unsettling preexisting equal protection
doctrine. In Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo," a public utility
challenged the constitutionality of New York legislation governing its
operations. In assessing the utility's equal protection claims, the court
undertook an extensive and scholarly review of the evolution of Supreme
Court doctrine. It began by observing that Supreme Court doctrine was
"presently in a state of confusion,"' 24 and it referred to the history of the
rational basis test as "tumultuous.""' Citing Lee Optical, among other
cases, the court noted that, at least "[u]ntil the early 1970s,' 126 the rational
basis test was applied with great deference to legislative classifications.
After tracing the emergence of intermediate scrutiny in the mid-1970s, the
court considered the impact of Cleburne. It characterized Cleburne as part
of a "wave of cases utilizing rational basis rhetoric but employing
noticeably greater scrutiny than was evident in cases"'127 like Lee Optical.
And while the court found that the "significance of these cases to the
application of the rational basis standard in equal protection challenges to
purely social and economic legislation, however, [is] unclear,"'2 it
20 Cobur v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 988 (D. Kan. 1985.)
121 Id. at 990. The court also cited Cleburne (as well as other cases) for the
proposition that "a court's genuine inquiry may test the rationality of the
classification." Id.
12Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986).
' Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
124 Id. at 409.
" Id. at 410. This reference came in the context of contrasting equal protection
with the perceived "doctrinal tranquility" of" 'minimal scrutiny' in the due process
context." Id.
126 Id. at411.
127 Id. at 414.
I2 Id. at 417. In a footnote, the court discussed a split in post-Cleburne lower
court decisions concerning the proper degree of scrutiny to give to legislation. See
id. at n.23.
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understood Cleburne to alter preexisting doctrine. It noted: "[tihe
application of the rational basis test applied in Williamson v. Lee Optical
and its progeny to the legislation in question would yield a different result
than would the application of the approach utilized in Cleburne."'20
Cases such as these seem to have borne out Justice Marshall's
concerns. However, an assessment of a wider range of equal protection
cases decided in the years following Cleburne paints a more equivocal
picture. While some courts saw in Cleburne evidence of the "flexibility"
of the rational basis standard, 3' others openly rejected such an interpreta-
tion.3 1 Entering the 1990s, there was little evidence that anything like a
consensus had developed in the lower federal or state courts for a Marshal-
esque understanding of Cleburne. Such an understanding, however, was
reflected in enough cases to suggest the existence of at least a moderate
degree of doctrinal confusion and instability.
B. The Gay Rights Cases
An important test of the way in which Cleburne was to be interpreted
came in a series of cases involving challenges to the military's policies of
discrimination against homosexuals. Beginning in the mid-to-late-1980s,
suits were brought in the federal courts seeking to overturn the military's
policy of exclusion and discharge of gays and lesbians.'32 Efforts were
made to convince the courts to find classifications based on sexual
preference suspect and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As a general
.
29 Id. at 420. According to its own admission, the court eventually applied a
more rigorous rational basis standard than it would have done had it followedLee
Optical. It placed on the state "the initial burden of articulating a legitimate
governmental interest served by the challenged classification," and concluded that
the state failed to show that the legislation was rational in light of the interest it
asserted. Id. at 421.
130 See Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352, 354-55 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding
Cleburne"particularly instructive oftheprinciple's flexibility," and representative
of "a departure from the extreme deference accorded legislative bodies in the
past").
131 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch., 784 F. Supp. 215, 223 (E.D.
Pa.), af'd, 977 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992).
132 For a general overview, see Kurt D. Hermansen, Comment: Analyzing the
Military's Justificationfor its Exclusionary Policy: Fifty Years Without a Rational
Basis, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 151 (1992). This author was counsel for the plaintiff
in one of these cases. See Secora v. Fox, 747 F. Supp. 406 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
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matter, these efforts proved unsuccessful. 133 However, the plaintiffs in these
cases had some (although mixed) success in arguing that discrimination on
the grounds of homosexuality failed even the rational basis test.
One such case was Pruitt v. Cheney.'34 Pruitt involved a suit brought
by an Army Reserve officer with an exemplary service record challenging
the military's decision to discharge her on grounds of her homosexuality,
which was first disclosed in a published interview she gave to the Los
Angeles Times. The military's action was based solely on Pruitt's own self-
identification as a lesbian; there was no evidence in the record that she had
engaged in homosexual acts.'35 Pruitt claimed that the act of discharging
her solely because of her publicly self-acknowledged status as a lesbian
violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.1 36
The government tried to fend offthis claim by relying upon High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industry Security Clearance Office,137 an earlier Ninth
Circuit case in which the court, applying a rational basis standard, upheld
against an equal protection challenge a Department of Defense policy
subjecting homosexuals to amore rigorous security clearance standard than
was applicable to others. The court concluded that "High Tech Gays will
not, however, do the service the government asks of it.' ' 38 It proceeded to
113 See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(concluding that a gay naval reserve officer discharged on grounds of
homosexuality was "not a member of a class to which heightened scrutiny must be
afforded"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny and upholding the discharge
of an avowed lesbian from the Army Reserve), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
But cf. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris,
J., concurring) (concluding that homosexuals are a suspect class for equal
protection purposes), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.
Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991) (concluding, in a case involving the rejection of
plaintiff's application for a position as public school teacher, that discrimination
based on homosexuality is inherently suspect), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992).
34 Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1020
(1992).
... See id. at 1161.
"'
36 Pruitt did not explicitly articulate an equal protection claim in her complaint,
but the court of appeals considered it nonetheless. See id. at 1164. Pruitt also
alleged that her discharge violated rights secured to her under the First
Amendment. The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim. See id. at 1163.
137 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1990).
13 Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1165.
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characterize its analysis in High Tech Gays in the following way: "[ilt is
true that we found the discrimination against homosexuals in that case to
have a rational basis, but it is clear that we applied the type of 'active'
rational basis review employed by the Supreme Court in [Cleburne] .... -"139
The court interpreted Cleburne's rational basis standard (as applied in High
Tech Gays) to require that the government establish on the record that it,
in fact, had a rational basis for the challenged discrimination. 140 The court
had before it only a complaint that had been dismissed without the
government having had an opportunity to establish such a record. The court
therefore concluded that on remand, "[a]ssuming that Pruitt supports her
allegations with evidence, we will not spare the Army the task... of
offering a rational basis for its regulation, nor will we deprive Pruitt of the
opportunity to contest that basis. 14'
The Pruitt court's interpretation of Cleburne was unmistakably at odds
with the Lee Optical paradigm for rational basis review. By requiring the
military to provide a record sufficient to convince a reviewing court that it
actually had a rational basis for discriminating against homosexuals, the
court was, in effect, allocating to the government the burden of establishing
the rationality of its policy. The heavy presumption of rationality associ-
ated with truly deferential review was simply not in play. Moreover, the
notion that a reviewing court would accept at face value any plausibly
legitimate justification for a legislative classification-indeed, that a court
would even hypothesize a legitimate justification where the government
offered none or where none was apparent from the legislative materi-
als-was completely absent from the Pruitt court's opinion.
Pruitt's application of an "active" rational basis review illustrates the
sort of muddying of the equal protection waters predicted by Justice
Marshall's separate opinion in Cleburne.42 And while other courts have
applied truly deferential rational basis scrutiny in the course of upholding
13 9 1d.
140 Thus, the court rejected the government's argument, which might have had
some plausibility hadthe court applied theLee Opticalrational basis paradigm, that
the military's "discrimination against homosexuals should be held to be rational as
a matter of law, without any justification in the record at all." Id. at 1166.
1411d.
142 See supra note 104. Of course, it is open to conjecture whether Marshall
would have found the application of active rational basis review in Pruitt to be an
abuse of judicial power. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S.
1009 (1985) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ, dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(suggesting that classifications based on homosexuality should be subject to
heightened scrutiny).
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the military's discrimination against homosexuals," Pruitt at least
suggested that a litigation strategy seeking to invoke Cleburne to infuse
rational basis review with real content might prove successful. However,
subsequent developments in the Supreme Court soon challenged this
conception of Cleburne.
V. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW REVISITED
Whether or not the Supreme Court actually saw a need to clarify or
shore up the deferential nature of its rational basis standard, it handed down
several decisions in the early 1990s which arguably did just that. Heller v.
Doe'" was probably the most important of these cases.145 Heller involved
an equal protection challenge to Kentucky's statutory scheme governing
the involuntary commitment of mentally disabled persons to state
institutions. The statutes provided that the applicable burden of proof for
commitment of the mentally retarded was the clear and convincing
evidence standard, while commitment of the mentally ill was to be
governed by the more stringent standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. In
addition, relatives and guardians of allegedly mentally retarded persons
were accorded rights to participate in commitment proceedings, while no
such rights were accorded relatives of the allegedly mentally ill. Both the
,
43 As indicated earlier, the record in cases applying rational basis review to the
military's discrimination against homosexuals is mixed. Compare Meinhold v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (following
Pruitt and enjoining the Navy from discharging a serviceman on the basis of his
homosexual status), aff'd in part and rev'd inpart, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994),
with Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F. 3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997)
(applying rational basis review and rejecting a challenge to the military's "don't
ask/don't tell" policy on homosexuals), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 794 (1999); Able
v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2dCir. 1998) (same). For a discussion ofpost-Pruit
developments in this area, see infra Part V.
,"Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
,4 Two other cases decided in the early 1990s reflect the same approach to
rational basis review as Heller. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307 (1993); Nordinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). The three cases are now often
cited together as exemplifying the requirements of rational basis review. See, e.g.,
Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 125-26
(1999) (per curiam); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 948 (1996). I focus on Heller because it presents the Supreme Court's
clearest and most careful recent elaboration of the rational basis test, and because
I believe it has become the standard citation for that test.
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federal district court 46 and United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit147 applied a rational basis standard and held these distinctions
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed, applying the rational basis standard to the
Kentucky statutes. 48 The respondents had argued in their brief that the
rational basis standard contemplated by Cleburne required Kentucky "to
demonstrate how the differences it alleges are relevant to the classification
it seeks to defend,"' 49 and that the state had failed to do so.15° Respondents
also argued that Cleburne stood for the need to give "careful attention" to
the sort of interests asserted by the mentally retarded in Heller, and that
Kentucky's differential treatment of the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill could not survive such "attention."''
The Court was not persuaded. While it did not rely upon or even cite
Lee Optical, the tone and tenor of its analysis left little doubt that it saw
'4 See Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
147 See Doe by Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992).
14' The respondents, in their brief, had argued for the applicability of "some
form of heightened scrutiny." Since they had contended in the lower courts that
rational basis review was applicable, and since the lower courts had in fact applied
rational basis review, the Court found that the question of whether or not some
form ofheightened scrutiny was applicable was notproperly presented. SeeHeller,
509 U.S. at 318-19. The respondents' decision to rely upon the rational basis
standard in the lower courts apparently was attributable to at least two factors. First,
respondents claimed that there was no reason for them to argue for heightened
scrutiny since, in an earlier round of proceedings, "the Sixth Circuit had already
upheld respondents' equal protection arguments on the basis of the rational basis
analysis set forth" in Cleburne. Respondent's Brief, 1993 WL 290154, at *23. In
fact, the Sixth Circuit had cited Cleburne in its initial opinion. See Doe v. Austin,
848 F.2d 1386, 1394 (6th Cir. 1987). But while it is possible to construe the court's
rational basis analysis as entailing more meaningful scrutiny than might have been
called for had it been applying the Lee Opticalparadigm, there is no evidence from
its opinion that the Sixth Circuit understood Cleburne as either requiring or
justifying any sort of heightened scrutiny under the rational basis label. Second, the
respondents arguedthatFouchav. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71(1992), decided afterthe
Sixth Circuit decision that was then before the Court, "strongly suggested" the
appropriateness ofapplying "ahigher level of scrutiny" to the Kentucky legislation
challenged in Heller. Respondent's Brief, 1993 WL 290154, at *24.
14' Respondent's Brief, 1993 WL 290154, at *15.
"' See id. at *17 ("[Kentucky] has not begun to demonstrate how such
differences would justify lowering the standard of proof for committing allegedly
mentally retarded persons or permitting third persons, with potentially adverse
interests, to participate as parties in the commitment proceedings.").
'
51Id. at *26.
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rational basis review to be every bit as deferential as the review contem-
plated by Lee Optical. "2 For example, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
noted that "rational-basis review in equal protection analysis 'is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices" ,,;" that "a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of
validity";' that where rational basis review is applicable the government
"need not 'actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale support-
ing its classification' ,,; 5s and that a classification "must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."' 56
While Justice Kennedy did not cite Cleburne directly in his discussion
of the requirements of rational basis review, the question of its proper
interpretation was raised explicitly in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion.'s7
Justice Souter initially addressed the respondent's argument, which the
majority had found not properly presented, that heightened scrutiny should
be applied to the Kentucky statutes at issue. He concluded, citing Cleburne,
that "the distinctions wrought by the Kentucky scheme cannot survive even
that rational-basis scrutiny, requiring a rational relationship between the
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose, which
we have previously applied to a classification on the basis of mental
disability.' ' 5 Thus, he continued, "I need not reach the question whether
scrutiny more searching than Cleburne's should be applied."'5 9 S outer went
on to observe:
Cleburne was the most recent instance in which we addressed a classifica-
tion on the basis of mental disability, as we did by enquiring into record
"s2 Although the Heller Court did not rely upon Lee Optical, another equal
protection case, FCCv. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993), decided
several weeks before Heller, did prominently cite Lee Optical in the course of
articulating and applying a very deferential rational basis standard. See id. at 316.
153 Heller, 509 U.S. at 319.
154 Id.
5 5 Id. at 320 (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. , 15 (1992)).
116 Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Communication, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993)).
The Court also noted that "the burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Id.
(quoting Lebnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
..
7 See id. at 335 (Souter, J., dissenting).
i8Id. at 336-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
's
9Id. at 337 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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support for the State's proffered justifications, and examining the
distinction in treatment in light of the purposes put forward to support it.
While the Court cites Cleburne once, and does not purport to overrule it,
neither does the Court apply it, and at the end of the day Cleburne's status
is left uncertain. I would follow [it] here.16
As this passage suggests, Justice Souter, speaking for three members
of the Court,6 1 saw Cleburne as establishing a true alternative to the most
deferential model of rational basis review. And while Justice Souter's
concerns about the status of Cleburne may not have been answered directly
by the Heller majority, they did not go without comment. Thus, Justice
Kennedy noted: "We have applied rational-basis review in previous cases
involving the mentally retarded and the mentally ill.... In neither case did
we purport to apply a different standard of rational basis review from that
just described."' 62
VI. DOES CLEBURNE SURVIVE HELLER?
Whether or not Heller constitutes a reaffirmation of true Lee Optical
deference is a question to which I will return shortly. But, whether or not
the Court intended to make clear its intention to recommit itself to a
"virtual rubber stamp"'" rational basis review, did it put to rest any
suggestion that Cleburne properly could be construed to infuse means-ends
scrutiny with any meaningful content?
With respect to this question, an examination of recent gay rights
litigation may again prove instructive. Recall that in its decision in Pruitt,
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Cleburne, contra Lee Optical, to endorse an
"active" rational basis review, one which required the government "to
establish on the record that its policy had a rational basis."'' Shortly after
the Supreme Court decided Heller, Margarethe Cammermeyer challenged
the National Guard's action discharging her from military service based on
"6 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
,
61 Justice Souter's dissent was joined in fullby Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
162 Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). In addition to Cleburne, Justice
Kennedy cited Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981). The reference to the
rational basis review "just described" was, of course, to its most deferential form.
'
6 Fallon, supra note 9, at 79.
'"Pmittv. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,1166 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit has
not been alone in characterizing Cleburne as establishing an "active" form of
rational basis review. See Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1998.) For
a discussion of Pruitt, see supra Part IV.B.
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her admission that she was a lesbian. The district court held that her
discharge violated her rights to equal protection. 16 Prior to applying the
rational basis standard, the court found it necessary to decide "the viability
of the standard of review" 166 applied in Pruitt in light of Heller. The
defendants argued that "'the continuing validity of Pruitt is undercut' by
Heller,"'67 and that "Pruitt was 'superseded' and 'rendered moot' by
Heller."'68 The court concluded, however, that the "contention that Pruitt's
vitality has been extinguished by Heller is without merit."'169 While it
acknowledged that Heller made clear that "the government policymaker is
not required to submit evidence to justify its policy, and may offer only
'rational speculation' to explain the discriminating classification,"1 0 the
court found that it "remains obligated to determine whether there is a
rational basis for the policy."'' In the court's view, the fact that Heller did
not simply uphold the Kentucky statute "as a matter of law, without any
inquiry into its rationality,"'72 and that it "closely examined the State's
asserted bases for the differential treatment of the two classes and found
that there were plausible rationales for each of the statutory distinctions
challenged in the case,"'7 required the conclusion that the court "remains
obligated to determine whether there is a rational basis for the policy.'
74
While Cammermeyermightbe understood to have construedHellernot
to have eviscerated the active rational basis review that Pruitt had derived
from Cleburne, subsequent post-Pruitt gay rights cases suggest a different
view ofHeller's impact."5 In a series of cases decided by the federal courts
161 See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal
dismissed as moot, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). The district court also concluded
that Cammermeyer's discharge violated her substantive due process rights.
'6 Id. at 915.
1671d. at 916.
168 1.d.
169Id. at 917.
170 id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
74 Id. The court also based its conclusion concerning the continuing vitality of
Pruitt on another recently decided Ninth Circuit case in which the circuit court had
observed thatPruitt stood forthe proposition "that ifthe Government discriminates
against an individual on the basis of homosexuality and does not demonstrate a
rational basis for doing so, it will have violated that individual's constitutional
rights." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Brigle, 17 F.3d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1994)).
"T' This equivocal description of Cammermeyer is intentional. Although the
district court clearly believed that rational basis review had some bite, it noted that
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of appeals, Heller has provided the touchstone for determining the
requirements of rationality review. 76 For example, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in an en bane opinion, upheld the Naval
Academy's discharge of Joseph Steffan, a homosexual midshipman who
had admitted to being a homosexual. 177 The government argued that it was
rational for it to presume that a person who conceded being a homosexual
would engage in homosexual conduct, which its regulations prohibited.7 '
Steffan claimed that the rationality of the classification drawn by the
military was undermined by the possibility that not all admitted homo-
sexuals would engage in the prohibited conduct.1 79 Citing Heller, the court
said that it was compelled to accept the generalization underlying the
classification concerning the relationship between the acknowledgment
of homosexual status and the propensity to engage in homosexual
conduct.180 In response to the dissent, the court felt obliged to clarify its
understanding of Heller. The dissent, it contended, maintained that the
rationality of the classification was belied by the fact that the government
"Heller did not address the proper scope of a court's rational basis review where,
as here, the plaintiff alleges the governmental policy at issue is based solely on
prejudice." Id. As I have noted earlier, the Supreme Court has held that prejudice
alone can never provide a legitimate basis for discrimination, irrespective of
whether the classification in question is "rationally related" to the goal ofprejudice.
See supra note 75. Whether or not the district court in Cammermeyer believed that
Heller contemplated meaningful rational basis review absent a claim of prejudice
was left unclear.
176 See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(beginning its discussion of the equal protection analysis of the Naval Academy's
discharge of a homosexual midshipman with extensive quotations from Heller);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256,261 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807
(1997) (citing Heller in its equal protection analysis of the Air Force's discharge
ofahomosexual servicemember); Ablev. United States, 155 F.3d 628,632 (2d Cir.
1998) (beginning a discussion ofa"long series of cases" definingthe requirements
ofrationalbasis review with quotations fromHeller); Thomassonv. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 928 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996) (featuring quotations from
Heller in a discussion of rational basis review); id. at 954 n.9 (Hall, J., dissenting)
(citingHelleras "stating constitutional minimum for legislative findings underlying
a classification").
177 See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 677.
178 See id. at 685. Steffan did not challenge the military's prohibition of
homosexual conduct.
179 See id. at 687.
18 0 See id.
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failed to "demonstrate" a factual basis supporting it.' According to the
court, the dissent "miscited" Heller for this proposition; the court restated
Heller's admonition that "the theory of rational basis review.., does not
require the [government] to place any evidence in the record."' 82
Other cases in the gay rights area have reflected the same understand-
ing of Heller. 183 No recent equal protection challenge to the military's anti-
gay policies has been successful; in the recent cases, the courts have shown
no inclination to see in Cleburne any warrant for serious rational basis
review. If there had been any doubt whether Heller should be construed to
reconfirm the Lee Optical paradigm, these cases would seem to have put
such doubt to rest.18
VII. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW TODAY
If Heller represents the prevailing standard for rational basis review,
does it truly command the near-total abdication of the Lee Optical
paradigm? Or put somewhat differently, does Heller instruct lawyers that
unless there are grounds for triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny, any
effort to challenge governmental regulations on equal protection grounds
is destined for failure? Although the general prospects for successful
'rational basis challenges would seem extraordinarily poor, there may
,
8
, See id. at 689. The dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of
its interpretation of rational basis review underHeller, claiming that it did not "rely
on any argument that the government has failed to support [the inferences drawn
in the regulations] with evidence." Id. at 709 (Wald, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 690 (citing Heller, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)).
m See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
,8 This is not to say that the application of truly deferential rational basis
review to uphold discipline of gays in the military has not gone without challenge
or criticism. Illustratively, Judge Reinhardt, in his dissent from a recent Ninth
Circuit decision upholding the Navy's and the National Guard's discharges of gay
serviceman under the military's "don't ask/don't tell" policy, concluded that the
presumption that a serviceman who acknowledges his homosexual status is more
likely to engage in homosexual acts than one who remains silent about his
homosexuality had "no rational basis." Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard,
124 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 794 (1999). Similarly, Judge Fletcher, dissenting from a decision upholding
the Navy's discharge of another serviceman for acknowledging his homosexuality,
found in the Supreme Court's cases, including Cleburne and Heller, a requirement
of meaningful rational basis scrutiny. Phillips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1432 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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remain limited circumstances in which rational basis review can be invoked
to invalidate classifications.
First, Heller does not disturb the principle that even where there are no
grounds for the formal application of heightened scrutiny, classifications
whose only explanation or justification is prejudice will be invalidated. As
noted earlier, even prior to Cleburne the Court had made clear that all
classifications had to be supported by legitimate interests, and that the goal
of singling out any class of persons solely for the purpose of disadvantag-
ing members of the class is not constitutionally legitimate.'85 Cleburne
itself reiterated and applied this principle, and nothing in Heller or any
subsequent Supreme Court decision questions its continued vitality. '86
Moreover, even after Heller, the mere allegation that a classification
is motivated by prejudice may be sufficient to provoke a court to engage
in a more searching inquiry than that contemplated by Lee Optical. Once
again, a gay rights case is instructive. In Able v. United States,187 military
personnel challenged the military's "don't ask/don't tell" policy toward
homosexuals. The policy requires discharge, subject to some exceptions,
of those who either engage in homosexual conduct or who acknowledge
their homosexuality. The plaintiffs, relying on Cleburne, argued that the
policy violated equal protection because it was animated by prejudice
against homosexuals."8 They argued that, under Cleburne and other
cases,' 89 the court was required to do something that cases like Lee Optical
and even Heller almost certainly would not require: scrutinize "the
justifications offered by the government to determine whether they were
rational."' 90 The court rejected this argument. While it acknowledged that
Cleburne contemplated a judicial examination of "the benign reasons
advanced by the government to consider whether they masked an imper-
missible underlying purpose,"' 91 the court concluded that this sort of
... See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.86 As noted earlier, this principle was recently reaffirmed and applied by the
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
"87 Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
188 See id. at 634.
189 The plaintiffs also relied upon Romer and Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984).
190 Able, 155 F.3d at 634. By referring to the need to "scrutinize" the
government's proffered justifications for the discrimination, the court clearly was
contemplating imposing on the government a burden not required by truly
deferential rational basis review.
191 Id.
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scrutiny, while called for in "the civilian context," was inappropriate in the
"military setting," where special judicial deference was required. 192
Nonetheless, the court felt obliged to observe that "the rationales provided
by the United States, grounded in the extensive findings set forth in the Act
itself, are sufficient to withstand ... the plaintiffs' equal protection
challenge."193 Truly deferential rational basis review would not have
required the government to "ground" its rationales for a classification in
legislative "findings," extensive or otherwise. 94
The notion that an allegation of prejudice imposes a burden on the
government to convince a court that a classification was actually supported
by legitimate purposes is, of course, not free from problems. In the gay
rights cases, the claim that prejudice underlies discrimination against
homosexuals, even if ultimately found unpersuasive, is surely plausible. 95
In other contexts, the plausibility of a claim of prejudice may be more
192 See id.
193 d. The court noted that the military's "don't ask/don't tell" regulations were
"supported by extensive Congressional hearings and deliberation." Id. at 635. Only
after it referred to "this extensive legislative examination, embodied in numerous
findings," did the court conclude that "we cannot say that the reliance by Congress
on the professional judgment and testimony of military experts and personnel that
those who engage in homosexual acts would compromise the effectiveness of the
military was irrational." Id.
194 Another gay rights case is instructive on this point. In Cammermeyer v. Aspin,
850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed as moot, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th
Cir. 1996), the district court held that the discharge of a National Guard officer who
acknowledged that she was a lesbian violated equal protection. The plaintiff claimed
that the policy was based on prejudice toward homosexuals. The court noted that
Heller "did not address the proper scope of a court's rational basis review where, as
here, the plaintiff alleges the governmental policy at issue is based solely on
prejudice." Id. at 917. The court then considered the relationship between the
military's anti-gay policy and the purposes or goals which the government actually
advanced in its defense. I have discussed other aspects of the court's analysis earlier.
See supra notes 165-175. What is interesting to note here is that the court seemed to
proceed under the theory that the plaintiff's allegation of prejudice required it to
engage in more meaningfil scrutiny than would otherwise have been appropriate.
Thus, the court concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, the Court should review
the entire record to determine whether the proffered bases for the Government's
policy are rational or motivated solely byprejudice against homosexuals." Idl at 921
(emphasis added).
195 See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the military's "don't ask/don't tell" policy is imper-
missibly based on prejudice).
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difficult to evaluate, and it is likely that courts will be reluctant to accord
it burden-shifting effect.
96
Heller also leaves open the possibility that some classifications, even
if not based on prejudice, may be found irrational in the constitutional
sense. In Heller, the Court acknowledged that "even the standard of
rationality as we so often have defined it must find some footing in the
realities of the subject addressed by the legislation."'197 Heller itself did not
explain what this "requirement" might entail, nor did it provide guidance
for determining how it might affect the litigation burdens or requirements
of the parties. 198 While some judges might find in this requirement a
meaningful (or, in any event, not wholly illusory) restraint on the
government's power to classify,199 such an interpretation would seem
difficult to square with the extraordinary deference that permeated the
majority's opinion in Heller.2"
196 A claim ofprejudice, if credited, is likely only to have the limited effect, as
I believe was suggested by the Second Circuit in Able, of requiring the government
to advance some legitimate interest which it plausibly could claim is served by the
classification in question. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir.
1998). To be sure, this should usually be a very easy burden for the government to
satisfy. But it is still more than truly deferential rational basis review would require.
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (holding that the government was not
required to actually articulate a purpose or rationale supporting a classification).
'
97Heller, 509 U.S. at 321.
'9' The requirement that a classification have "some footing" in the realities of
the subject it addresses may simply represent a restatement of the notion, reiterated
in Heller, that it cannot be "wholly irrelevanf' to the achievement of the
government's objective. Id. at 324. But since the government need not articulate
its actual objectives, and since acourtis required to hypothesize any "conceivable"
objective which the classification couldhavebeen enacted to further, any "footing"
a classification might have in the actual realities of any subject to which it might
pertain would be wholly fortuitous. In addition, the Court made clear that a
classification could be supported by any "reasonably conceivable state of facts"
which might make it appear rational. Id. at 323. This is hardly a standard that
provides much bite to the "footing in the realities of the subject [matter]" idea. Id.
at 321.
"9 In her dissent from an opinion upholding the military's "don't ask/don't tell"
policy, Judge Fletcher, relying in part on the failure of the Navy to establish that
its differential treatment of homosexuals and heterosexuals has some footing in
reality, concluded that the classification failed rational basis review. See Philips,
106 F.3d at 1434 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing Heller).
21 The likelihood that Heller's reference to the need to justify a classification
in the "realities" of the subject matter will not be taken very seriously is illustrated
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One of the Supreme Court's most recent equal protection cases
suggests the degree of deference that post-Heller rational basis review
entails. In Central State University v. American Association of University
Professors,2°1 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to an
Ohio statute that restricted the ability of state university faculty members,
but no other public employees, to collectively bargain over their
workload.202
In a 4-3 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court, applying rational basis
review, concluded that it could not "find any rational basis for singling out
university faculty members as the only public employees as defined in [the
statute] precluded from bargaining over their workload."20 3 It reached this
conclusion only after carefully reviewing evidence introduced in the trial
court by the defendants in support of their assertion that the restraint
imposed on university faculty actually furthered the goal of quality
undergraduate education.? 4
by Judge Wald's dissenting opinion in Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en bane), a leading gay rights case in which the court upheld the Naval
Academy's policy of discharging those who acknowledged their homosexuality.
Judge Wald took pains to note that her belief in the irrationality of the Academy's
policy was not premised directly on the government's failure to demonstrate that
its policy was "rooted in 'reality'." Id. at 709 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Heller).
Instead, she claimed that the government's failure to do so "serves only to reinforce
our view of its basic irrationality." Id.
201 Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 119 S. Ct. 1162
(1999) (per curiam).
202 The plaintiffs asserted claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
equal protection component of the Ohio Constitution.
203 American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Central StateUniv., 699 N.E.2d463,
470 (Ohio 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1162 (1999) (per curiam).
204 The parties stipulated that the object of the legislation was "to effect a
change in the ratio between faculty activities in order to correct the imbalance
between research and teaching at four-year undergraduate state institutions created
by a faculty reward system which prizes research over teaching." Id. at 468. The
Ohio Supreme Court found that "[i]ntrinsically, this is a concern over the quality
of undergraduate education and, therefore, is a legitimate governmental interest."
Id.
True rational basis review, of course, does not require the government to
articulate, nor does it require a court even to identify, the actual interest or purpose
that underlies a classification; even a "reasonably conceivable" purpose will
suffice. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Thus, in defending against an
equal protection challenge, in theory the government is not obliged to proffer, or
for that matter even to speculate about, a (legitimate) purpose against which the
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This review led the court to
conclude with confidence that there is not a shred of evidence in the entire
record which links collective bargaining with the decline in teaching over
the last decade, or in any way purports to establish that collective
bargaining contributed in the slightest to the lost faculty time devoted to
undergraduate teaching.205
By now, of course, it should be apparent that this approach to rational
basis review looks much more like the one suggested by Cleburne than by
Heller.2" 6 As Justice Cook's dissent noted, "[r]ational-basis scrutiny is
intended to be a paradigm of judicial restraint, and where there are
plausible reasons for the General Assembly's action, a court's inquiry must
end."20 7 The dissent was clearly correct in noting that the state had "no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification,"20 8 and that the plaintiffs had the burden "to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it."2" Thus, the only question was
"whether the General Assembly rationally could have believed that
imposing uniform workload standards would promote its objective.'21 °
That it clearly was rational-or that it at least might have been
perceived as rational-for the Ohio General Assembly to prohibit only
rationality of a classification is to be assessed. Presumably, the government's
lawyers could concede that they had no clue why the classification was enacted and
invite the court to imagine possible reasons why a legislature might have enacted
the statute in question, reasons which might make the classification plausibly
appear rational. For fairly obvious political, tactical, and even psychological
reasons, however, government lawyers mightbe understandably reluctant to default
completely in assisting a court in identifying actual or potential reasons why the
legislature enacted a classification, especially since there will almost always be
some legitimate purpose which will make the classification seem rational. One is
seldom likely to encounter cases in which a court will be left completely on its own
in conducting rational basis ends scrutiny. For further discussion of this point, see
supra note 95.
205 Central State, 699 N.E.2d at 469. The court went on to note that the
evidentiary record appeared "to indicate that factors other than collective
bargaining are responsible for the decline in teaching activity." Id.
206 The Ohio Supreme Court majority cited neither Cleburne nor Heller in its
opinion. Instead, it relied exclusively on its own precedents in discussing the
applicable equal protection analysis.
207 Central State, 699 N.E.2d at 471 (Cook, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 472 (Cook, J., dissenting).
2 9 Id. (Cook, J., dissenting).
21o Id. (Cook, J., dissenting).
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university faculty members from engaging in collective bargaining over
their workload was signified by the United States Supreme Court's
summary disposition of the case. Without even providing the parties an
opportunity to brief the issues on the merits, and in a per curiam opinion,
the Court granted the writ of certiorari and reversed and remanded. The
Court relied on a string citation of recent equal protection cases beginning
with Heller,"1 and agreed with the Ohio Supreme Court dissent's conclu-
sion that the failure of the state to show that its treatment of faculty
members actually furthered the law's objectives was irrelevant to its
rationality." It is difficult to imagine judicial review more deferential than
this. 213
211 See Central State Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 119 S. Ct.
1162, 1163 (1999) (per curiam).
212 Only Justice Stevens' dissent questioned the propriety of the Court's
'"mechanistic" equal protection analysis. Id. at 1166 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a brief concurring opinion noting that a
"summary disposition is not a fit occasion for elaborate discussion of our rational
basis standards of review." Id. at 1164 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer also noted the prerogative of the Ohio Supreme Court to alter the
outcome of the case by explicitly reconsidering the matter under the Ohio
Constitution. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Ginsburg's somewhat enigmatic reference to rational basis "standards"
of review was echoed in Justice Stevens' dissent. Stevens argued against summary
disposition of the case, in part because the Court has not been entirely consistent
in the way it has articulated the rational basis standard. See id. at 1166 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The tenor of Stevens' dissent indicatedthat, unlike the majority, he was
prepared to view the rational basis standard as imposing at least some non-trivial
degree of restriction on the state's power to classify:
Indeed, I would suppose that the interest in protecting the academic
freedom of university faculty members might provide a rational basis for
giving them more bargaining assistance than otherpublic employees. In any
event, no one has explained why there is a rational basis for concluding that
they should receive less.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court
considered whether the Ohio statute "rationally relates to a legitimate interest
under our interpretation of Ohio's Equal Protection Clause." American Ass'n of
Univ. Professors v. Central State Univ., 717 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1999).
Describing the federal rational basis standard as part of a "carefully conceived
structure of equal protection review," the Ohio Supreme Court refused to accept the
plaintiff's invitation to apply the state standard more vigorously than its federal
counterpart: "We affirm, therefore, that the federal and Ohio Equal Protection
Clauses are to be construed and analyzed identically." Id. at 291.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Of course, every activity, even scratching one's head, can be called
a "constitutional right?' if one means by that term nothing more than the
fact that the activity is covered (as all are) by the Equal Protection Clause,
so that those who engage in it cannot be singled out without "rational
basis" .... But using the term in that sense utterly impoverishes our
constitutional discourse.2
14
Recently, a distinguished federal judge observed that "[t]he limited role
that the courts continue to exercise under rationality review... remains a
significant bulwark against unreasonable and illegitimate classifica-
tions."2 '5 Cleburne's suggestion of a rational basis standard that actually
required the government to demonstrate that a classification rationally
furthered legitimate interests might have made this observation a fair
one.216 But despite early, if not entirely clear and consistent signals from
the lower courts, this understanding of Cleburne no longer seems tenable.
Thus, one scholar's reference to Cleburne as "a narrow, perhaps vanishing,
exception to the post-Lochner Court's extreme deference to government
action outside of the fundamental right or 'suspect class' scenarios, 21'
accords the case even greater doctrinal significance than it is due.
After Heller, the conception of rational basis review as a "bulwark"
against significant, and even unreasonable, discrimination seems more to
reflect wishful thinking than a candid assessment of Supreme Court
doctrine. Heller fully reinstated the Lee Optical paradigm of rational basis
review and left little doubt that, except where pure prejudice is involved,
Cleburne cannot be counted on by lawyers to persuade a court to scrutinize
seriously any classification to which heightened equal protection review
would not properly be applicable. And any court which put the rationality
214 City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1872 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
215 Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, I., dissenting).
The quoted passage was also essentially contained in the original panel's opinion
written by Judge Mikva. See Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
vacated en banc, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
2161 take it as no coincidence that Judge Wald's reference to rationality review
as a "bulwark" was followed immediately by a citation to Cleburne. See Steffan,
41 F.3d at 708.217 Massaro, supra note 90, at 93 n.227. The reference to "Lochner," of course,
is to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the notorious substantive due
process case which stands for illegitimate judicial activism.
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of a classification to any meaningful test-say, by requiring the govern-
ment to present evidence showing that the classification actually does
further any legitimate goals (real or imagined)-could fairly be accused of
participating in, as one court put it, "an undisciplined rebellion against the
governing constitutional doctrine."218
From one perspective, of course, this state of affairs may be unproble-
matic. After all, the Supreme Court has never really developed a coherent
theory of the Constitution or of equal protection which would explain why
any sort of judicial supervision, "meaningful" or otherwise, of classifica-
tions embodied in the run of economic and social welfare is required, or
even justified.219 If the Court were to conclude that no such theory exists,
one might expect that it would simply say so, in which event it might
announce that challenges to classifications to which heightened scrutiny is
inapplicable are not justiciable." To continue to speak as if the "require-
ment" that a classification be rationally related to a legitimate interest still
means something when it so seldom does is not cost-free. It encourages
lawyers and clients to believe that every official act of unequal treatment
can be converted into a federal constitutional case, resulting potentially in
211 Steffan, 41 F.3d at 689.
219 This is not to say that efforts to construct such a theory have not been
undertaken. For example, Michael Perry has argued for an originalist account of
the Fourteenth Amendment according to which the Amendment was understood
by the founders to incorporate a general prohibition against" 'arbitrary' as distinct
from 'reasonable' exercises by a state of its 'police power.' "PERRY, supra note 32,
at 75. This principle, which Perry traces to the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
would require the courts to invalidate any official discrimination which is "not
reasonably designed to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 76.
As part of this inquiry, a court should determine whether a legislature could
reasonably or plausibly conclude that the benefit secured by a classification is
proportionate to its costs. See id. at 156. As Perry conceives it, this standard would
appear to entail a degree of judicial deference as substantial as that required by
Heller. For an earlier scholarly effort to construct a theoretical defense of the
rationality requirement, see Bennett, supra note 24. For general criticism of the
search for "rationalism" in constitutional law, including equal protection, see
Robert F. Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 9
(1987).
220 As an alternative to invoking justiciabilty, such equal protection claims
might be found to raise no substantial federal question and thus, at least in the
federal courts, be subjectto dismissal under the federal rules of civil procedure. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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the sort of systemic inefficiencies that Supreme Court Justices and others
are so fond of condemning."
21 Promising even the possibility of successful rational basis challenges to
legislative classifications-when the prospects of winning are nearly
negligible-may also risk erosion of public respect for the legal system. Moreover,
uncertainty or misunderstanding concerning the real nature of rational basis review
can have troublesome implications beyond the world of litigation.
For example, in recent decisions, the Supreme Court has limited the power of
Congress to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., City
ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power is limited to remedying or preventing the violation of the
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (same). In light
of these decisions, some lower courts have held that Congress's Section 5 power
does not permit it to expand the protections of the Equal Protection Clause beyond
those recognized by Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Humenansky v. Regents
ofthe Univ. ofMinnesota, 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-1235,
2000 WL 29320 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000). Were Congress to enact legislation under
Section 5 to remedy or prevent state action that it believed violated (or would
violate) the Equal Protection Clause, a defense of that legislation would be
dependent on a showing that the state action to which the legislation was directed
would fail the standard of review that would be applicable were the state action
challenged directly in court. If there were no basis for the application of heightened
equal protection scrutiny, Congress would have to conclude, and then be prepared
to establish in court, in the event that its legislation were challenged as exceeding
its Section 5 powers, that the state action it had targeted would not survive rational
basis scrutiny. See Alsbrook v. Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), cert.
grantedinpartsub nom. Alsbrook v. Arkansas, No. 99-423, 2000 WL 63302 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 2000) (holding that Congress's effort, in the American with Disabilities
Act, to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity was invalid since the
Act purported to prohibit state action that would not fail rational basis scrutiny
under Cleburne); Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, vacated in
part sub nom. Jim C. v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999)
(reaching the same conclusion concerning Congress's effort to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
Thus, where Congress purports to legislate to remedy or prevent discrimination, a
determination of the proper scope of rational basis scrutiny may well be crucial to
the constitutional validity of its efforts.
As this Article was about to go to press, the Supreme Court handed down a
decision that provides a striking example of this. In Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, Nos. 98-791 & 98-796, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 498 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000), the
Court was presented with the question whether Congress's effort, in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), to subject the states to suit
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Why the Court continues, in the rather colorful words of one observer,
to "mouth' ' 2 rational basis review when it so infrequently has any real
meaning is anyone's guess. Perhaps the rationality requirement represents
an example of what Professor Sunstein has called an "incompletely
theorized agreement" about the meaning of constitutional equality, an
agreement among Justices, perhaps for reasons that are only inchoate and
not widely shared, that some forms of legislative classification are simply
too "arbitrary" or senseless to be squared with any plausible meaning of the
concept of "equal protection of the laws." Moreover, holding open even
the theoretical possibility that an ordinary classification might be invali-
dated while simultaneously insisting that such occasions will be extremely
rare may accord with the prudentially informed values of "decisional
ninimalism.''u4 On this view, even without a general theory of equality
which might justify a more general policy of judicial intervention, the
Court may wish to maintain the prerogative for limited engagement in the
political process where important political or moral values are at stake.'
in federal court exceeded its power, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. In seeking to
effect such an abrogation, Congress relied upon its assessment that the remedies
provided under the ADEA were necessary to address unconstitutional age
discrimination in which the states had been, or might, be engaged.
Testing this congressional judgment under the principles it had announced in
City ofBoerne, the Court considered whether the ADEA was a "congruent' and
"proportional" congressional response to age discrimination that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court concluded that the rational basis test was the
appropriate equal protection standard for age discrimination. It then found that the
record upon which Congress relied was insufficient to establish the requisite scope
or degree of unconstitutional age discrimination-that is, discrimination that would
not survive rational basis scrutiny if challenged in court-and held that "Congress
had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this
field." Id. at *53.
Klarman, supra note 18, at 248.
Sunstein, supra note 23; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV.L.REV. 1733,1737(1995) (describing further abstractions
in legal decisions).
4 For general discussion of minimalism, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASEAT
A TIME (1999).
9
' See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1132, 1137 (1999) (describing
rationality review as serving the narrow function of "limit[ing] government
authority by policing the outer boundaries of power").
[-VOL. 88
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER, INC.
Cleburne 's implicit challenge to the reigning equal protection paradigm
proved to be short-lived. As things now stand, expecting that a court might
invalidate a classification subject to rational basis scrutiny is like expecting
to win the lottery.16 For, as Justice Stevens recently noted, rational basis
review is indeed "tantamount to no review at all."' r
Professor Sunstein notes that ajudicial posture of unflagging deference is best
understood as a "maximalist" position, and, as such, may unduly limit the Court's
power to promote important constitutional and democratic values. See SUNsTEiN,
supra note 224, at 261 (noting that judicial restraint defines certain forms of
maximalism).
The engagement promoted by retaining the "trump card" of rational basis
review might be effectuated indirectly. A legislature acting with knowledge that
highly imperfect classifications may ultimately be exposedtojudicial scrutiny and,
in the extreme case, even invalidation, might be more attentive to the
discriminatory consequences of its action than one which believes itself to be
completely immune from judicial review. For an example of an approach to
rationality review that would, in the service of democratic principles, leave room
for at least a degree of judicial engagement in scrtinizing classifications, see
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,239 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).26 It is important to make adistinctionbetween expectations that are reasonable
in light of actual Supreme Court doctrine, and expectations that are premised in an
attorney's hope ofconvincing ajudge that a classification is so imperfect, so unjust,
or even so silly that it must be "irrational" in the equal protection sense. I do not
doubt, indeed I know for a fact, that some judges who are not fully versed in the
intricacies of Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence-say, a state trial judge who
only infrequently encounters federal constitutional issues-might be persuaded to
strike down as "unreasonable" a classification that should be viewed as "rational"
in the Lee Optical-Heller sense. Indeed, even judges whom one would expect to
know better sometimes succumb to such an inclination. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny to invalidate New
York's ban on physician-assisted suicide), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (reversing
the court of appeals; no Justice found New York's statute irrational). Nonetheless,
any attorney who advised a client that an equal protection challenge to a social
welfare or economic regulation had anything more than an outside chance of
success would, in my judgment, be flirting with malpractice.
2,7 FCCv. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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